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Sampling Bias in Climate-Conflict Research 
 
Critics have argued that the evidence of an association between climate change and 
conflict is flawed because the research relies on a dependent variable sampling strategy.1-
4 Similarly, it has been hypothesized that convenience of access biases the sample of cases 
studied (‘streetlight effect’5). This also gives rise to claims that the climate-conflict 
literature stigmatizes some places as being more ‘naturally’ violent.6-8 Yet there has been 
no proof of such sampling patterns. Here we test whether climate-conflict research is 
based on such a biased sample through a systematic review of the literature. We 
demonstrate that research on climate change and violent conflict suffers from a 
streetlight effect. Further, small-N studies in particular are strongly informed by cases 
where there has been conflict, do not sample on the independent variables (climate 
impact or risk), and hence tend to find some association between these two variables. 
These biases mean that research on climate change and conflict primarily focuses on a few 
well accessible regions, overstates the links between both phenomena, and cannot 
explain peaceful outcomes from climate change. This could result in maladaptive 
responses in those places that are stigmatized as being inherently more prone to climate-
induced violence. 
 
A growing number of policy makers, journalists and scholars are linking climate change to 
violent conflict.9 Nevertheless, scientific evidence of this relationship remains elusive due to 
heterogeneous research designs, variables, data sets, and scales of analysis.10,11 Amid the 
array of disparate findings is a core of meta-analyses based on statistical methods12,13 as 
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well as several in-depth studies linking climate change to highly prominent conflicts such as 
in Darfur or Syria.14,15 
 
Critics of this research point to an array of methodological problems, and to a lesser extent 
a deeper underlying problem with a study design that selects only cases where conflict is 
present or where data are readily available.1-4,10 Researchers have, for instance, intensively 
studied the impact of a multi-year drought on the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, while 
there is little analysis of responses to the same drought in Jordan or Lebanon, where no 
large-scale violence erupted.16 So, if the evidence of a causal association between climate 
and violent conflict is informed only by exceptional instances where violent conflict arises 
and climate also varies in some way, it is unable to explain the vastly more ubiquitous and 
continuing condition of peace under a changing climate.  
 
Other critics of the research claiming a link between climate change and violent conflict 
have pointed to the way it stigmatizes some places – most often ‘Africa’ or a few African 
countries – as being more naturally violent than others. It does this ignoring the many 
similar and/or proximate places where peaceful responses are the norm, and the complex 
political, economic, and institutional factors that cause violence and peace.4,6,8,17 Such 
‘mappings of danger’ can undermine the confidence of investors, local people and 
international donors and hence undermine sustainable development. They change the 
climate policy challenge from being one of adaptation with and in the interests of local 
people, to one of interventions to secure peace in the interests of those who fear the risk of 




So, it is important to understand if the research claiming a link between climate change and 
violent conflict is based on a biased sampling strategy. Yet the extent to which this is the 
case remains untested. We therefore survey the relevant academic literature for the period 
1990-2017 using the Scopus database and a systematic review – a method often used to 
analyze large bodies of literature with a high degree of rigor and replicability, and which is 
described in the Methods section with data provided in the Supplementary Datasets 1 and 
2.19,20 
 
The analysis of the relevant literature shows that Africa is by far the most frequently 
mentioned continent (77 mentions), followed by Asia (45) (see Table 1). The dominant focus 
on Africa in the literature is largely stable over time (see Figure 1). This is surprising given 
that Asia is also home to places which are politically fragile and highly vulnerable to climate 
change21,22, but much more populous. Other continents with significant vulnerabilities to 
climate change (and which are at least in some places also prone to violent conflict), such as 




Most frequently mentioned places 
By continent By world region 
Africa 77 Sub-Sahara Africa 44 
Asia 54 Middle East 22 
Europe 7 Sahel 22 
South America 6 North Africa 13 
Arctic 5 South Asia 12 
North America 5 Central Asia 8 
Oceania 1 Arctic 6 
  South America 6 
Table 1: Most frequently mentioned continents and world regions in climate-conflict 
publications 
 
With respect to world regions, Sub-Saharan Africa was by far most frequently mentioned in 
the literature analyzed (44 times), although the Middle East (22) and the Sahel (22) were 
also discussed often (see Table 1). At the country level, Kenya and Sudan were most 
frequently analyzed by climate-conflict researchers (11 mentions), followed by Egypt (8) as 
well as India, Nigeria and Syria (7). Complete lists of the continents, world regions and 





Figure 1: Frequency of mentions of continents in the climate-conflict literature per year 
The bars illustrate how frequently a continent was mentioned in the climate-conflict 
literature per year (2007-2017). No bar indicates that the continent was not mentioned in 
this year. 
 
In order to check whether the selection of cases is biased towards the dependent variable, 
we run a number of poisson regressions (see Supplementary Tables 1-3 for the full results) 
using data on, among others, the number of times a country is mentioned in the literature 
and on battle-related deaths between 1989 and 2015.22 Though the battle-related deaths 
dataset is far from perfect and tends to underestimate small-scale violence (which many 
scholars believe is most likely to be most affected by climate change), it is currently the best 
global dataset on violent conflict prevalence available. 
 
The correlation between the number of mentions and a high death toll is positive and 
significant in all models (Figure 2). This suggests that studies on climate-conflict links which 
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research one or a few individual countries are disproportionally focusing on cases already 
experiencing violent conflict. Holding other factors constant, we estimate that countries 
with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths are mentioned almost three times as often as 
countries with a lower death toll. This is further supported by a comparison of the top ten 
countries of each list (Table 2). Six of the ten most often mentioned countries are also 
among the ten countries with the most battle-related deaths. The four remaining countries 
are also characterized by significant numbers of battle-related deaths, ranging from 2,775 
(Egypt) to 8,644 (South Sudan).  
 
Rank Number of mentions Battle-related deaths 
1 Kenya 11 Rwanda 520,599 
2 Sudan 11 Syria 280,474 
3 Egypt 8 Afghanistan 180,839 
4 India 7 Ethiopia 176,868 
5 Nigeria 7 Iraq 106,721 
6 Syria 7 DR Congo 101,966 
7 Israel/Palestine 6 Sudan 91,727 
8 Ethiopia 5 Sri Lanka 65,372 
9 Iraq 5 India 54,194 
10 South Sudan 5 Nigeria 47,488 
Table 2: Countries most often mentioned in climate-conflict literature and countries with 




To contrast, sampling of countries to be studied seems to be hardly informed by the 
independent variable. A high exposure and a high vulnerability to climate change according 
to the ND-GAIN index23, overall, are negatively, but not significantly correlated with the 
number of times a country is mentioned (Figure 2). The same holds true for the correlation 
with our climate risk measure based on the Global Climate Risk Index (CRI)24, though 
correlations are mostly significant here (Figure 2), indicating that countries less at risk from 
climate change are more often discussed in the climate-conflict literature. 
 
 
Figure 2: Changes in the frequency of mentions in the climate-conflict literature 
depending on country characteristics 
Relative changes in the frequency with which countries are mentioned in the climate-
conflict literature depending on climatic and other characteristics (estimated incidence rate 
ratios with 95% confidence intervals in dark grey). Estimated changes are not significant at 
the 5% level where confidence intervals cross the dashed line. Model 1 analyses the full 
sample, Model 2 includes ‘English speaking country’ instead of ‘Former British colony’, 
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Model 3 replaces ‘Agriculture > 25% of GDP’ by ‘Agriculture > 25% of employment’, Model 4 
uses ‘High vulnerability’ rather than ‘High exposure’ to climate change, Model 5 drops 
Kenya and Sudan from the analysis, and Model 6 drops all African countries. 
 
Table 3 adds further evidence to this claim. None of the ten most climate change-affected 
countries according to NG-GAIN’s exposure score or the Global Climate Risk Index are 
among the top ten countries considered in the climate-conflict literature. Further, the 
literature on climate change and conflict does not discuss eleven of these twenty high 
climate risk countries at all (Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Seychelles, Tuvalu, Yemen), despite many of them being 
characterized by significant political instability. There may be several reasons for these 
disparities, which include a greater interest on conflict-prone countries, issues of 
accessibility (discussed in the next paragraph), and a preference for studying countries with 
a higher global political relevance. 
 
For sure, the literature largely agrees that climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’ which 
aggravates existing tensions. It would hence make little sense to focus predominantly on 
politically very stable countries. Also, several analyses explicitly select their cases based on a 
number of scope conditions hypothesized to make climate-conflict links more likely.16,25 But 
if (especially small-N) studies focus on places already suffering from intense violent conflict, 
while highly vulnerable countries receive little attention, results may be distorted and 
significant knowledge gaps remain. In line with this, we find that further climate sensitivity 
measures like contribution of the agricultural sector to employment (negative, insignificant 
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effect) and to GDP (slightly positive and significant, but not robust effect) are weak 
predictors for the number of mentions (Figure 2). 
 
Rank Number of mentions Exposure Climate Risk 
1 Kenya 11 Rwanda 0.622 Honduras 11.33 
2 Sudan 11 Kiribati 0.620 Myanmar 14.17 
3 Egypt 8 Burundi 0.617 Haiti 18.17 
4 India 7 Zambia 0.613 Nicaragua 19.17 
5 Nigeria 7 Tuvalu 0.612 Philippines 21.33 
6 Syria 7 Marshall Islands 0.600 Bangladesh 25.00 
7 Israel/Palestine 6 Yemen 0.597 Pakistan 30.50 
8 Ethiopia 5 Seychelles 0.582 Vietnam 31.33 
9 Iraq 5 Oman 0.568 Guatemala 33.83 
10 South Sudan 5 Micronesia 0.567 Thailand 34.83 
Table 3: Countries most often mentioned in the climate-conflict literature compared to 
countries most exposed to and at risk from climate change 
 
Our results further indicate a streetlight effect in climate-conflict research, that is, 
researchers tend to focus on particular places for reasons of convenience.5 On the continent 
level, the availability of conflict data might have played an important role, especially as 
statistical analyses are very widespread in climate-conflict research.10 Large geo-referenced 
conflict datasets spanning several countries and longer time periods were until very recently 
only available for Africa.26 Indeed, when just considering statistical studies (n = 35 in our 
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sample), the focus on Africa as a continent (65%) and Sub-Saharan Africa as a region (57%) is 
even stronger than in the full sample. 
 
On the country level, all models reveal a positive and significant correlation between the 
numbers of mentions in the literature and countries that are former British colonies (Figure 
2). A likely explanation for this finding is that countries formerly colonized by Great Britain 
have better data (e.g. historic weather records), which makes research more convenient.5 
Further, in four of the six most mentioned countries (Sudan, Kenya, India, Nigeria). English is 
an official language (which makes research more practicable for many Western scholars). 
However, the positive correlation between these two factors indicated by model 2 (Figure 2) 
is not significant. The presence of a streetlight effect in climate-conflict research is a reason 
for concern as it suggests that case selection (and hence knowledge production) is driven by 
accessibility rather than concerns for explanation or practical relevance.27  
 
One should note that the database we used for the literature search (Scopus) mainly 
captures journal articles written in English. Including French and Spanish language journals 
would likely yield a different picture of countries and regions most frequently mentioned. 
 
The statistical findings provided by this study are robust to the use of different model 
specifications, the inclusion of further control variables, and the removal of the two most 
frequently mentioned countries (Kenya and Sudan) from the analysis (see Figure 2 and the 
online appendix for further information). Results also hold when analyzing Africa only, 
hence suggesting that the detected sampling biases not only occur on a global scale, but are 




To conclude: Critics have warned for some time that environmental security and climate-
conflict research tend to choose cases on the dependent variable.2,3,28 Our study provides 
the first systematic, empirical evidence that such claims are warranted. Studies focusing on 
one or a few cases tend to study places where the dependent variable (violent conflict) is 
present and hardly relate to the independent variable (vulnerability to climate change). In 
addition, climate-conflict research strongly focuses on cases which are most convenient in 
terms of field access or data availability. 
 
To be clear, we do not intent to criticize individual studies, which often have good reasons 
to focus on specific regions, countries and phenomena. However, the sampling biases of the 
climate-conflict research field as a whole are deeply problematic for at least four reasons.  
 
First, they convey the impression that climate-conflict links are stronger or more prevalent 
than they actually are.3 This is especially the case for studies using few cases. Large-N 
studies usually contain a large number of non-conflict cases in their sample, although they 
draw all of these cases from a few regions or countries (see below).  
 
Second, focusing strongly on cases of violent conflict limits the ability of (qualitative) 
researchers to study how people adapt peacefully to the impacts of climate change or carry 
out the associated conflicts non-violently.4,29 Such knowledge, however, would be 




Third, evidence of climate-conflict links comes primarily from few regions and countries 
which are convenient to access, such as (Sub-Saharan) Africa. This is even more so an issue 
of large-N, statistical analyses. While such a bias is not problematic per se as considerable 
parts of (Sub-Saharan) Africa are vulnerable to both climate change and conflict, this also 
implies that other very vulnerable regions, for instance in Asia and especially in South 
America and Oceania, receive little scholarly attention.  
 
Finally, over-representing certain places leads to them being stigmatized as inherently 
violent and unable to cope with climate change peacefully.4,6 This is especially the case for 
Africa as a continent, the world regions Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, and 
countries like Kenya, Sudan or Egypt. Such stigmatization might contribute to the re-
production of colonial stereotypes, especially as 81% of the first authors in our sample were 
affiliated with institutions in OECD countries. And it can also provide legitimation for 
imposed security responses in certain places at the expense of co-produced adaptation 
responses in all places at risk from climate change.17,18,30 
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Systematic Review of the Literature 
 
The primary method for analyzing the academic literature on climate change and violent 
conflict is the extraction of quantitative data based on a systematic review, although this 
approach is complemented with qualitative knowledge about the research field if 
appropriate. Systematic reviews are widely used for summarizing the findings of large 
amounts of studies in order to reveal current trends in a given field of research, to identify 
knowledge gaps, and to offer directions for future research.19,20 
 
Systematic reviews aim to analyze a given (and often large) body of literature with a high 
degree of rigor, transparency and replicability. In a first step, they define the phenomena 
and the relevant literature they are interested in. Thereafter, systematic reviews establish a 
selection strategy that clearly describes the methods used to collect documents and the 
criteria for including relevant documents for further analysis. Finally, systematic reviews 
iteratively extract information from the included documents using a coding scheme that 
qualitatively and/or quantitatively reconfigures pertinent information into a more 
meaningful form 31,32. 
 
This study focuses on the geographical representations of the literature on climate change 
and violent conflict. Almost all publications in the research field analyze the (potential) 
impacts of climate change, such as higher temperatures or droughts. Consequentially, we 
include studies on such impacts as long as they are explicitly related to climate change. By 
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contrast, we excludes studies on past, natural climatic changes because they yield only 
limited insights regarding the impact of current, anthropogenic climate change on violent 
conflict.33 
 
The relevant literature uses a range of different concepts and operationalizations of conflict 
in general or violent conflict in particular.34 Our analysis is concerned with the debate of 
climate change and violent conflict in general rather than with specific types or definitions 
of conflict. Therefore, we focus on studies that link (the predicted impacts of) climate 
change to deliberate acts of physical violence perpetrated by states or organized non-state 
groups. Further, the analysis includes literature published between 1990 (when the first 
IPCC report was published) to April 10 2017. 
 
After having specified the literature of interest, we produce the corpus of relevant studies 
by using the Scopus database. Scopus is advised to search through the titles, abstracts and 
keywords of articles. The search focuses on articles as they are often peer-reviewed and 
speak from a position of academic authority. In addition, climate-conflict research is an 
article field in which almost all new insights and influential hypothesis are published in the 
form of articles (rather than books). Searching the full text is avoided in order to exclude 
studies that do not primarily deal with climate change and violent conflict but mention such 
links in passing.  
 
The Boolean phrase used for the search is: (“climat*” OR “global warming” OR “weather”) 
AND (“violen*” OR “conflict” OR “war” OR “unrest”). “climat*” captures several relevant 
concepts like climate, climate change, climate variability or climate impacts. Global warming 
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is a popular synonym for climate change. As some studies referring to the climate-conflict 
debate prefer terms like weather extremes or whether variability, the term “weather” is 
included as well.35,36 “violen*” and “war” are good indicators for violent conflicts as defined 
above, while “conflict” is used by many authors as a short form for violent conflict.34 
Including “unrest” is important as terms like civil unrest frequently have violent 
connotations.37 
 
The resulting search yields 5,938 articles. The first author of this study reads through the 
title, abstracts and keywords of these articles and dropped 5,749 because they either do not 
deal with climate change and violent conflict or fail to mention any location of (presumed) 
climate-conflict links. We focus on the title, abstract and keywords to keep the sample 
manageable and to make sure that only articles focusing on (rather than just briefly 
discussing) links between climate change and violent conflict are included in the sample. 
The remaining 189 articles are inspected in greater detail, including a screening of the full 
texts and discussions between the authors of which “borderline” articles to incorporate into 
the sample. This second step of vetting excludes another 65 articles because they are 
primarily concerned with non-violent conflicts or with climate security more broadly.  
 
We do not differentiate between articles whose results are supportive or skeptical towards 
links between climate change and violent conflict because even the most critical articles (i) 
indicate that the places in question are considered by the broader scholarly community as 
likely stages for climate-related violent conflict and (ii) might contribute to a streetlight 
effect or other forms of selective knowledge production in climate-conflict research.5,38,39 
Further, we do not add additional articles based on either our knowledge of the literature or 
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the reference lists of the articles in the sample. Doing so would not have substantially 
changed the sample, but make it harder to replicate the analysis. The final sample hence 
contains 124 articles in total (see Supplementary Dataset 2 for a full list of those articles). 
 
In order to disentangle the geographical representations inherent in the literature, we code 
these articles for places that are identified as (past, present or future) stages of climate-
related violent conflicts. If a location is mentioned without reference to a (supposed) link 
between climate change and violent conflict, it is not counted. Coding for location occurs 
using three distinct categories: continent, world region and country. Separating information 
into these three groups allows (i) to make clear distinctions between more (e.g. Kenya) and 
less (e.g. Africa) specific locations as well as (ii) to analyze and compare findings on similar 
geographic scales.40 We also note the country of the institutional affiliation of the first 
author of each study at the time of publication. The online appendix can be consulted for a 
full list of the coding decisions for each article under consideration. 
 
We follow an inductive approach grounded in the data when coding for world regions. 
Specifically, we use world regions that are either frequently mentioned in the literature, 
such as the Sahel, or represent geographically connected clusters of places frequently 
mentioned (such as Central Asia). For borderline countries, the coding decision is based on 
the geographic context in which the country is discussed. Turkey, for instance, is always 
discussed with regard to its water relations with Syria and Iraq and hence coded as part of 
the Middle East (region) and of Asia (continent). When specific physical geographic features 
such as rivers or mountain ranges are mentioned without explicit relation to the specific 
countries or world regions, all nested countries and world regions associated with that 
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feature are extrapolated. Articles that mention the Arctic as a possible climate-conflict stage 
are coded as ‘Arctic’ in both the continent and world region categories (despite the ‘Arctic’ 




We use a poisson regression model to test whether cases in the climate-conflict literature 
are selected based on their political, environmental, socioeconomic and geographic 
characteristics. We use likelihood ratio and Vuong tests to rule out more complex models – 
i.e. a negative binomial or a zero-inflated poisson model (results are available upon 
request). Our sample contains 183 countries. We use the number of battle-related deaths 
from the UCDP dataset22 to test whether climate-conflict analyses select on the dependent 
variables. For ease of interpretation we use a binary indicator for countries with more than 
1,000 battle-related deaths in total. Using such a binary indicator also minimizes the risk 
that the results are distorted by outlier cases (such as Rwanda) and moderate reporting 
biases. Results are stable when using a count variable instead (results are available upon 
request). 
 
To test whether climate-conflict analyses select on the independent variable, we use several 
binary indicators which are based on climate risk and -vulnerability measures from the ND-
GAIN (2015 version) and Climate Risk Index (1996-2015 values) datasets.23,24 To test for a 
possible streetlight effect, we use binary indicators for former British colonies and English-




We further use binary indicators for African and Asian countries to test for a regional 
selection bias. We also add a control for populated countries (2015 values).41 Population 
density and growths have been highly popular variables in early environmental security 
research and are also correlated with some of our explanatory variables. Finally, we include 
the contribution of the agricultural sector to a country’s GDP and employment (2015 or 
most recent values).42,43 Both measure indicate an economic sensitivity to climate change 
which could be a key driver of case selection in climate-conflict research.44 
 
Descriptive statistics for all utilized variables can be found in Supplementary Table 1, along 
with a correlation table (Supplementary Table 2) and the full poisson regression models 




All data generated during this study are included in the published article and the 
Supplementary Datasets 1-3. All data used for this study are fully referenced in the 
published article (including the Methods section). 
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